EMMERSON MNANGAGWA, BLAISE COMPAORE AND MOBUTU SESE SEKO: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON HOW HISTORICAL ALLIES TURNED VILLAIN

CONTENTS

1.Abstract 3

2.Introduction 3

3.State, Power, Presidentialism and Transition in Africa 6

4.Case 1: Mnangagwa and Mugabe 14

5.Case 2: Compaore and Sankara 19

6.Case 3: Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko 26

7.Similarities 38

8.Differences 41

9.Lessons and Reflections 44

10.Conclusion 47

References

1.ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research paper is to argue that more studies remain to be done on the root causes of the transitions of political power, namely in Africa. To better understand the leadership of Africa today, namely the transition of power, it is important to explore its history and study its structure pre-independence. These causes are instability in the society and weak democratic tradition. These instabilities are explained in the reflection of the cases as they reoccur in the African states. Both of these two can be traced back to the colonial tradition and its implications to African states and societies. Additionally, in this paper we compare the similarities and differences in three cases, where the former political allies turned to political villains. Critically analysing the differences and similarities allows for the explanation of the pattern of coups in the history of African politics and leadership. Allies were able to become villains due to the fact that these leaders were once interdependent of each other and as such there was an opening for the deception and said betrayal amongst former comrades. The dynamic of politics has changed in the recent years due to the involvement of the other institutions in society (family, economy, religion etc.) and their influence on the construct of African politics. This also sheds light on the underlying issues and historical friendships among the former allies. These case studies are supported by the research made in topics of state power, presidentialism and transition in Africa. These themes will be analysed during pre-colonialism, colonialism and post independence in the continent.

2.INTRODUCTION

There has been a pattern in African states where the smooth transition of power has not occurred. This has been the case between various African leaders including Mobutu Sese Seko and Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Robert Mugabe and Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe and Blaise Compaore and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso. Many of the African transitions of power have been military coups (McGowan & Johnson, 1986). For example, between 1956 and 1985 there were 71 attempted and 60 successful coups (ibid, 541). The high tendency for the coups was explained by the low level of industrialization in the African states (ibid, 539). Military coups have also been studied by J. C. Jenkins and A. J. Kposowa. They argue that the military centrality theory, ethnic antagonism and economic dependency theory all partly explain the high tendency of military coups in the continent (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990).

Although the military coups have being widely studied, the question of how political allies turn into villains remains a widely untouched research topic. The political leaders do play a crucial role in political agenda setting, resource distribution and political actions (Wyk, 2007). The layers of formal and informal political leadership has been researched by Jo-Ansie Van Wyk and she presents that the lack of good leadership has been addressed as one of the main challenges for the Africa's development (Wyk, 2007, 4). It is argued in the article that due to the unstable conditions of the society, the power vacuum left by the public authority is often filled by private authority. This means that "the power is thus exercised de jure and de facto". (Wyk, 2007, 7.) This has been one aspect central to the changes in power studied in the three case studies, which are presented in this paper.

Presidentialism is a central aspect in our research paper as all three case studies of political allies turning into villains are closely tied to the institution of presidency. It is acknowledged in the academic literature that the majority of African states are semi-presidential regimes (Moestrup, 2011). This means that although the states have moved forward from the pure presidential regimes, the president remains a significant political figure. In another article it is argued that the most of African regimes can be considered presidential and not parliamentary regimes for two reasons. These reasons are that there exists presidential constitutions on the one hand and on the other the “power is intensely personalized around the figure of the president”. (van de Walle, 2003, 310.)

In this paper we will first discuss state power within the continent, presidentialism and transition of power within Africa. The continent has had some difficulty dealing with state power since the attainment of freedom and independence. Before colonialism, native African societies had fixed succession systems, either hereditary or based on special qualities. Leaders had to be of royal blood, either a son or daughter of the main wife or queen preferably. Seldomly the matrilineal line of family would be considered and the nephew would gain succession. Some had to have special abilities such as leading in battle or bringing rain (rain maker). Introduction of the metropolitan succession system brought by colonial administrators gave way to a wave of military coups over the post independence period in Africa. (Peter & Kopsieker, 2006.)

In this paper we will critically analyse the ideologies and political practices carried out by these allies, the origin and duration and ultimate ends of these allies. Addiotionally, we will look at the circumstances in which these friendships emerged and developed, to better understand their role in the political systems of the respective states. The cases used in this paper are Robert Mugabe and Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe, Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso and Patrice Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The major findings are that although in all three case studies the former political ally ended up removing their friend from office one way or another, the measures and ways in which this transition of power occured differed significantly. The three cases also share some common features. All of these notions presented above will be extensively discussed throughout this paper.

3. STATE, POWER, PRESIDENTIALISM AND TRANSITION IN AFRICA

STATE POWER

To better understand state power in the post-colonial era of Africa, it is imperative to get to grips with the history and nature of the state as a supreme institution of society on the continent, especially in regards to its formation. Africa is considered by various scholars alike as both an interesting and important case study as far as state formation is concerned. According to Southall (1974) numerous new and emerging nation states were forrmed in Africa during the 1960s than had been formed in the rest of the world for many centuries. Thus, Africa presented the largest number of examples both of recent indigenous states and of contemporary states formed out of colonial territories. According to him the analysis of the African state has mostly been done from a western standpoint, with African societies being hastily judged based upon western societal models. Because of this, over the long term, such views have led to stigmatization of African states, by affirming that, having been established by colonial law, they merit such epithets as “external”, “quasi-state”, “artificial” or “pseudo-state” (Bellucci, 2010).

Bayard (1989) argues that a historical view of the State in Africa built upon the base of pre-colonial state traditions and on the colonial experience offers a more fair and balanced viewpoint of the state in Africa. He further continues to argue that because contemporary African states have received influences both from colonialism and from pre-colonial kingdoms and empires, and are based both upon the Rule of Law and upon ancestral political traditions, which alternately draw near to and keep a distance from religion; such phenomenon’s are complex thus consequently make the understanding and management of the African state more challenging. Bellucci however believes that an understanding of the African state can be found in the following:

within itself, or through its connections with the outside world; in the institutional aspects of power, in its central decision-making bodies, its leaders and administrators; in bodies where negotiation takes place and agreement is reached; and in the production of public goods and services, all of which are permeated by traditional and modern values

In his own conclusion, Bellucci believes that the Western State model is used as a reference, supported by concrete data, to conclude that Africans are unfit to manage their state and, therefore, that westerners should do it for them (as they did under colonialism); or that these states should be dissolved, restoring the kingdoms and tribes of old, thereby enabling local and regional governance that is “better adapted” to the ways of Africans. Many criticisms are to be found claiming that the post-colonial state was led by bloodthirsty dictators and dishonest persons, and that this explained all the evils of the continent forgetting that such people exist not only in Africa, but everywhere, and that they are still very much in evidence (Biyoudi-Mampouya, 2008).

The exercise of power within the post-colonial African state has always been an interesting topic to various political commentators and scholars alike. Government authority in general could be considered as a delicate and crucial aspect of how the state ultimately functions. As Fessler (1949) noted, “distribution of governmental authority is one of the oldest and most abiding problems of society. By our solutions of this distributive problem we determine whether the government will be stable or unstable; whether it will be a dictatorship . . . whether we shall have the rule of law, the rule of men, or the rule of men under law.” Miliband (1983) describes the state as deeply and pervasively involved in every aspect of

economic life and considers it as a permanent and active presence in class conflict and in

every other kind of conflict. According to him the state plays a great and growing role in the

manipulation of opinion and in the ‘engineering of consent’. As Max Weber once famously

put it, the state has ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’. It is thus responsible

for international affairs and for deciding what the level and character of the country’s

armaments should be. As Aihie (2014) notes, the relevance of the post-colonial state in Africa is slowly diminishing. He emphasises that this dilemma is not only compunded by the perception amongst most Africans that the state is colonial in nature but also because the state exists as a fictional concept in the minds of citizens.

The disappearance of the relevance of the state poses a great threat to its exercise of power, Aihie continues to note that because the state is considered an alien institution, plundering it for parochial interest is seen as a virtue rather than a vice. Because of such internal contradictions of the state in the continent, he notes that its scarce means for survival leads to despondency and low morale. This is highlighted by wide occurring events such as the army of unemployed youth taking advantage of the opportunity costs for rebellion and violence against the state and other anti-social behavior such as robbery, cultism and a growing kidnapping enterprise (especially in West-Africa). Aihie emphasizes that because of all these factors and more, for both rulers and the ruled; disorder is more than a ‘political instrument’ but highlights the criminalization of the state and in ways that allow the formal means of governance to run side by side with the informal.

While in many parts of the world, societies are ever more recognizing the importance of political stability and democracy as the underpinning for societal development, the African continent is still bogged down by instability in a number of regions. In the post-colonial era, contemporary Africa leadership has not had a mental or ethical re-calibration in terms of how they treat their own citizens, the society and public goods (Neera, 1994). Elite-capture of the state institutions, stomach philosophy, patronage, political corruption, nepotism and tribalism in public service and abuse of state power resources and impunity remain the hallmarks of many governments in Africa. The government is never a government of the people, but in most cases belongs to the tribe of the leader. Long term perspective of governance for the sake of the common good, sustainability, regeneration, and innovation are rare concepts to most contemporary African leaders, hence, they tend to be reactionary to situations (both domestic and international) because most of the planning is informed by acts of political convenience and less by the fundamentals of politics and political ideologies (Ong'ayo, 2013).

State power in Africa is threatened by various factors on the continent, though each unique to the particular countries or continental blocks concerned. One significant factor is that most conflicts have occurred or taken place on the continent of Africa, with some running into decades, with limited solutions. However, mythical notions about Africa’s problems, as purely inherent in the African way of doing things, exist. Conflicts on the continent have birthed political instability in numerous African states, with the entire continent undeniably facing difficult moments in the last 50 years. The other problematic factor facing African states is leadership. In this context, Africa has seen its freedom heroes turn into dictators, while plunder of natural resources, politics of exclusion and deprivation to tilt the balance of power continues to dominate the public sphere. Moreover, these problems have been pointed out and fought gallantly by ordinary Africans who have over the years expressed their discontent with regimes imposed upon them, through the complicity of the international community. To-date, almost every country in Africa is still haunted by historical injustices and oppressive structures that were bequeathed to the post colonial leadership. This is an aspect which informs the weak institutions of the state, flawed legislative systems and constant struggles for political power to the detriment of the well being of many nations, which could have moved on a path of development as part of modern societies (Ong'ayo, Political instability in Africa: Where the problem lies and alternative perspectives, 2008).

In contemporary Africa, as everywhere in the world today, the state has assumed a central role in a wider range of tasks such as fostering and maintaining economic growth, providing the welfare of the citizens and ensuring law and order. But since gaining independence in the 1960's African states have manifested a steadily diminishing capacity for performing their accustomed functions in society. This has given rise to the now widely-accepted aphorism that states in Africa are in crisis. Evidence of the crisis can be found in several areas such as the lack of sustained economic growth. The reason for the short lived economic growth in post-independence states In Africa is found in the pervasive corruption and mismanagement among public officials, from the policeman on the street to the highest levels of government (Mozaffar, 1987).

It is not a baffling revelation that state power has been at the center of many detrimental factors that have been problematic in terms of Africa’s development. Chiweshe (2015) provides a case study of Zimbabwe, a country that forms part of the overall context of this paper. The author notes that power in that country forms part of or is at the center of the phenomenon that is corruption. He continues to emphasise that corruption, especially by state actors, has emerged as the biggest threat to poor people’s livelihoods as it impacts all spheres of their lives and reiterates that corruption is essentially a problem of power. Chiweshe concludes in his paper that removing corrupt politicians is not sufficient to eradicate poverty but that what is required is a fundamental change of the relations of power based on unequal structures. Corruption in a nutshell falls under the dreaded concept of abuse of state power. Although Although scholars such as Beattie (1959) expound upon the importance of checks and balances, institutional and systematic flaws of both the state and its political system hinder that crucial aspect from being effective in mitigating the abuse of state power.

Because of all these negative factors highlighted above, failure of the state in Africa has become closely linked to some states on the continent. In the first sense, failure is understood in terms of the inability of state institutions to control actors and processes within a given territory. There is no simple or single formula for understanding the causes of state failure in Africa. Nevertheless, the available literature on the subject often makes at least two relevant general distinctions. The first distinction is between states that fail because of a lack of relevant capacities and those that fail to promote the interests of all their inhabitants through political choice, often with the intention of benefiting the incumbent regime and its supporters at the expense of another group within the state. Robert Mugabe’s manipulation of ZANU-PF and state power in Zimbabwe is a paradigmatic example of a regime that chose to deny basic rights to certain segments of its population in an attempt to bolster regime security (Williams, 2003).

Presidentialism and Transition in Africa

Presidentialism or a presidential system is a democratic and republican system of government where a head of government leads an executive branch that is separated from the legislative branch, which in most states worldwide is also the head of state. Presidentialism entails a regime in which the president is elected by popular vote (van Cranenburgh, 2011). In comparing political systems, van Cranenburgh has observed that the institutional choice for a presidential or parliamentary system of government has been a long standing issue. She notes that African and Asian regions were relatively under-researched in terms of such institutional debates, with some notable (recent) exceptions. However, the institutional issues are very relevant to assess whether democracy will be instituted and sustained in these regions.

The scholar continues to explain that the third wave of democratization brought multi-party elections and consequently a degree of vertical accountability of the government to the electorate in these regions. However, considering the prevalence of (varieties of) presidentialism and semi-presidentialism in Africa, her interest was to examine whether these systems also allow some form of horizontal accountability between the institutions of government. According to her horizontal accountability is an essential addition to vertical accountability, because it operates continuously, during the terms of government. Van Cranenburgh believes that a study on separation of powers is both scientifically and politically relevant because the creation of horizontal accountability requires a degree of separation or balance of powers, because where power is concentrated in a single entity, there are no entities with a degree of independence or autonomy to hold the power center accountable. Van Cranenburgh further reiterates the following:

It needs no elaboration to point out that such (presidential) systems have been relatively rare in Africa until the early 1990s. Consequently, the choice of democratic institutions and their consequences was low on the research agenda. Only during the period of transfer of power from colonial rulers had such issues been prominent: both the United Kingdom and France were busy during the 1950s and 1960s with an effort to ‘transplant’ their own systems of government to African and Asian soils, and the effort was very much based on implicit assumptions about the inherent qualities of the political system of the ‘mother country’. As has been widely discussed in the literature on African politics, the newly planted systems did not take root very well and a process of institutional adaptation followed soon. Notably, African leaders opted for unitary republics with an executive president, also in those cases where a parliamentary system had been installed. In the name of national unity for development, the executive president was granted a wide range of powers (at the same time political opposition was curtailed). As many features of the planted system were retained, the result has been the prevalence of hybrid systems of government. This may constitute a second reason for the low profile of African countries in the institutional debate: the hybrid nature of these regimes presents some inherent difficulties in terms of classification and analysis. When Africa began to install democratic reforms, beginning in Benin, a new round of institutional adaptation followed. Francophone countries reinstated forms of semi-presidential government, making innovative adjustments in the model in terms of the definition of powers for the president and the premier. The complex and hybrid nature of African regimes continues to present obstacles for any systematic comparison. he very definition of the presidential regime type suggests that separation of power is present in these regimes, while in semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes we would expect less separation between thebranches of government. However, earlier research has already suggested that Africa’s hybrid regimes defy such expectations.

In his essay, Linz (1985), a vocal critic of the presidentialism system, argued that presidentialism is less likely than parliamentarism to sustain stable democratic regimes. Linz bases his argument about the superiority of parliamentary systems partially on the observation that few long established democracies have presidential systems. He maintains that the superior historical performance of parliamentary democracies stems from intrinsic defects of presidentialism. He analyzes several problems of presidential systems mainly: in presidential systems the president and assembly have competing claims to legitimacy, meaning that both are popularly elected, and the origin and survival of each are independent from the other. Second, the fixed term of the president's office introduces a rigidity that is less favorable to democracy than the flexibility offered by parliamentary systems, where governments depend on the ongoing confidence of the assembly. He argues that:

“Presidentialism entails a rigidity that makes adjustment to changing situations extremely difficult; a leader who has lost the confidence of his own party or the parties that ac- quiesced [in] his election cannot be replaced."' By virtue of their greater ability to promote changes in the cabinet and government, parliamentary systems afford greater opportunities to resolve disputes. Such a safety valve may enhance regime stability. Third, presidentialism "introduces a strong element of zero-sum game into democratic politics with rules that tend toward a 'winner-take-all' outcome." In contrast, in parliamentary systems "power-sharing and coalition-forming are fairly common, and incumbents are accordingly attentive to the demands and interests of even the smaller parties." In presidential systems direct popular election is likely to imbue presidents with a feeling that they need not undertake the tedious process of constructing coalitions and making concessions to the opposition.”

Thirdly, Linz states that presidentialism introduces a strong element of zero-sum game into democratic politics with rules that tend toward a winner-take-all outcome. In contrast, in parliamentary systems power-sharing and coalition-forming are fairly common, and incumbents are accordingly attentive to the demands and interests of even the smaller parties. In presidential systems direct popular election is likely to instill presidents with a feeling that they need not undertake the tedious process of constructing coalitions and making concessions to the opposition. Fourth, the style of presidential politics is less propitious for democracy than the style of parliamentary politics. The sense of being the representative of the entire nation may lead the president to be intolerant of the opposition.

In Zimbabwe for example, attacks on the opposition were rife during President Robert Mugabe’s rule and even recently when current President Emmerson Mnangagwa took over. Opposition leader Joyce Mujuru, former Vice-President of Zimbabwe who was fired from the ruling ZANU-PF party, was rushed to the hospital with serious injuries to her person after being attacked in February by suspected ZANU-PF sympathizers (Zimbabwe opposition leader 'attacked' on campaign trail, 2018). Lastly, political outsiders are more likely to win the chief executive office in presidential systems, with potentially destabilizing effects. Individuals elected by direct popular vote are less dependent on and less beholden to political parties. Such individuals are more likely to govern in a populist, anti-institutionalist fashion.

Presidentialism is closely linked to democracy and thus the failure of presidentialism is consequently deemed to be the failure of democracy. According to van Tiem (2011) after decolonisation in Africa, Western colonists intended to have brought a democratic system into most African states. Institutions modelled largely on those of the departing Western states were introduced. In some states this system survived threats to democracy like authoritarianism and dictatorship, in others the system existed only temporarily, before the state fell back into (military) authoritarian rule. He explains that during the 1990’s a wave of democratisation spread through the African continent. After years of independence, democratic rule gradually became reality for African states, either enforced by external or internal factors. Externally, mainly the end of the Cold War, which brought about democratisation in Eastern European states, triggered protests against authoritarianism in Africa. Internally primarily protests from groups of society like churches, students, human rights groups and the media expressed their discontent.

As a key ingridient in democratic system and thus presidentialism, mutli-party democracy is considered by some to be imperative for an effective democratic system. However as van Tiem points out, some African scholars have concluded that Africa is not the most ideal breeding ground for the multi-party system, let alone for democratic experiments in the broader sense of the word.According to him, it is widely believed that although a multi-party system is a basic requirement if a democracy is to be built up, in itself it is not enough. He further highlights his point by stating that some scientists claim that parties breed conflict in fragile nation states, because most political parties often align along regional or ethnic lines. They will therefore not necessarily advocate policies designed to reflect a national perspective. This according to van Tiem highlights a failure in transition towards the presidential system by African states.

Transition, van Tiem argues is further compounded by economic prosperity and human rights. He quotes a few authors who support the notion that civil society needs focus, besides the implementation of democratic institutions alone. These authors claim that the ‘political democracy’ (of elections, and granting of civil and political rights) cannot evolve on its own. The democratic aspiration of African people is also confined to the demand for economic empowerment, better living standards, and adequate social welfare. Moreover, for the majority of the people, democracy is meaningful only when it delivers socio-economic goods. Legal difficulties in transitions exist as well, they involve the constitution, which van Tiem believes that without a popular and well-engineered constitution, good governance will depend solely on the benevolence of the leader (dictatorship).

4. CASE 1: MNANGAGWA AND MUGABE

Introduction

Zimbabwe like any other African state has always shown such great potential, but like any other state it too carries it’s scares of deception, corruption and colonial inheritances that speak through the leadership and dictatorship that is often found and toppled such as in the cases of Idi amin (Associated Press , 2003). African history has been one of violence and bloodshed, the road to power has never been an easy one, and often involves deception and betrayal a great example of this would be the rise and fall of Zulu kingdom, where Shaka Zulus death was caused by his own brothers (History.com, 2010) . In this paper we will seek to show the historical difference between Mugabe and Mnangagwa, by doing so we will be able to reveal how their friendship became and how their ranks grew interdependent of each other, whilst Zimbabwe nose-dived into economic crisis. We will effectively discuss the economic conditions of post-independence Zimbabwe leading to the overthrowing of Mugabe.

History between Mugabe and Mnangagwe

To begin with to understand Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s ties as to how the two politicians turned against each other, one needs to know the historical attachment of the two. In January 1983, when the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade (5 Brigade) of the army was deployed in Matabeleland North, which was known as the Gukurahundi massacre, Mnangagwa was Mugabe’s minister of state security (Cowell, 1983). That portfolio brought with it control over the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), a Rhodesian institution that was partly reconfigured in 1980 when Mugabe took power at independence which oversaw the safety and security of the presidium, meaning Mnangagwa was in charge of Mugabe’s security at that time (Mnangagwa: Mugabe's Sunken 'crocidile' , 2017).

However, by the time this intervention was over in 1984, an estimated 20 000 people had perished, hence many people had been tortured and displaced (Ndlangisa, 2017). With this regard we clearly see that the Gukurahundi incident was the origin upon which the two master’s (Mugabe & Mnangagwa’s villain characters were found. More so, in that era Mnangagwa was not only just involved in inciting violence but he executed it on behalf of his master Robert Mugabe (Ndlangisa, 2017). In this regard it is Mugabe’s architected ideas which at the end haunted/turned against him.

One can’t easily identify or clearly say when the strife between these two leaders started but for the sake of finding a starting point. The First the conflict between started during the party’s 2016 -2017 annually political rallies. The first incident which raised eyebrows between the two or the political tension of the party is when Mnangagwa was poisoned at party’s political rally such that he had to be rushed to the hospital (App, 2017). The tension proceeded when Mugabe’s wife always insulted Mnangagwa and military service chiefs during rallies, they went on up until Mnangagwa was fired from being the vice president (Africa , 2017). To some larger extent this was a move by Mugabe so as to consolidate his power within the presidium.

Moving on, upon Mnangagwa’s exit from the cabinet the next move for Mugabe was to get rid of service chiefs which were Mnangagwa’s loyalist, this how didn’t turn out well for the authoritarian leader, as of that moment, the service chiefs declared a state of emergency within the country assuming that they are protecting the president from people who are trying to dethrone him (Newsday, 2017). As negotiations went on between the service chiefs and the president, Mnangagwa was still on exile thus after a few conditions were met which led to Mugabe’s resignation it led Mnangagwa’s return from exile (Daily Nation , 2017).

In this regard we notice that it wasn’t Mnangagwa who turned against Mugabe but it was Mugabe who cast the first stone, however it was unfortunate that the stone didn’t fulfill its mandate as his plans backfired on him. More so, the arm played a crucial role in Mnangagwa’s hierarchy to the presidency, hence it was Mugabe’s students or loyalist which executed the Gukurahundi massacre which turned against him, this includes service chiefs, who currently occupy most cabinet positions within the country (Marima, 2017). Furthermore, the army played a crucial role just like in post-independence era in helping Mnangagwa rise to power as they were much involved in issues to do with regime church hence providing obstacles to democratic consolidation within the country.

Economic conditions of post-independence in Zimbabwe

A military coup doesn’t happen accidently certain conditions have to be present for it occur. According to Thomson these conditions are the ability of the military, the professional ethic of the military, self-interest and importantly the correct political, social and economic conditions (Thomson, 2010).Thomson further asserts that in a country with poor economic conditions the military is most motivated to intervene.

‘Thirty- seven years ago Robert Mugabe inherited a well-diversified economy with potential to become one of sub-Saharan Africa’s best performers’ (Pilling, 2017). This statement isn’t unique Zimbabwe is indeed believed to have had a lot of potential one could go as far as saying it could have been the powerhouse of Africa’s economy. Post-independence Zimbabwe’s economy took its worst nose dive in 2008 when civilians had to carry large amounts of money to buy basic goods such as bread this is also known as hyperinflation (Pettinger, 2017). One of the causes of this hyperinflation according to Pettinger is the lack of confidence in government, economy and political life he further asserts the fact that the government started printing out money at the rate at which they were supplying it (Pettinger, 2017).

After Zimbabwe got its independence in 1980 , during the 1990’s they immediately started with land reforms which resulted in forcedly taking land back from white farmers and giving it back to black farmers which had little to no experience in commercial farming (Pettinger, 2017). This hindered Zimbabwe’s export system to some degree, later leading to Zimbabwe having the second worst inflation in history (Berger, 2008).Zimbabwe’s debt also saw increase resulting in it owing 1.75 billion rand in foreign arrears, ‘because of this Zimbabwe has not been able borrow money from international lenders since 1999’ says the Reuters staff in an article (Reuters staff , 2017). All this provided for the best coup, the question however remains what took the military so long to intervene.

How Emmerson toppled Mugabe

Robert Mugabe had no idea that he’s reign of 37 years was about to end when it did. Mugabe was in the process of changing Zimbabwe’s main airport to “Robert Mugabe International Airport” (Malone, 2017). Mugabe was in power since 1980 and denied the people of Zimbabwe another president as he believed he would be in power until his passing, of which he’s wife Grace Mugabe was scheduled to take over as president (App, 2017). She called for a dynasty (Mugabe) to run the country forever. A convoy of which Mugabe thought was his personal security (but in actual fact was the military personnel who have been working with his enemies) rushed o Mugabe’s home and upon arrival, arrested the security officers in he’s home in the suburb. After being escorted into he’s home, General Constantino Chiwenga broke the rather bad news to Mugabe (Dzirutwe, 2017). This was the arrest of Mugabe by the military. His wife then asked to be permitted to fly to Malaysia in the fear of her life and that of her family.

Many senior army personnel made their way to the Mugabe mansion in the capital city to start a tense discussion of which Robert Mugabe now realised how serious the matter was and began by making an astonishing bid to save himself and possibly his wife, politically (Tromp, 2017). Chiwenga was offered the presidential seat by Mugabe once he had died in return if he called off the coup and also relived himself as the head of armed forces, this would result in his official retirement. Mugabe also offered Chiwenga immediate vice president position and thus being able to take over after Mugabe (Malone, 2017). However, Mugabe had one condition, that Grace (he’s wife) have a very important position in government when Chiwenga became president, Chiwenga refuse this offer. More than 30 army personnel carriers and 21 tanks had been moved into different locations (Wild, 2017). Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former vice president ran in Mugabe’s fearsome intelligence wing and was in charge of defence too before being appointed vice president. Grace Mugabe had believed that she would one day take over after her husband as president of Zimbabwe however, she believed Mnangagwa was her biggest competition. She and vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa were rivals to succeed Mugabe, and the fight between them fractured the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front, known as ZANU-PF (Simmons, 2017). She had managed to convince her husband in November to dismiss Mnangagwa of his position as vice president. The Mugabe’s accused Mnangagwa of using “witchcraft” against them (Malone, 2017). Grace Mugabe chose the Wrong man to fight with. Mnangagwa has a large support system amongst the army and war veterans (Mnangagwa: Mugabe's Sunken 'crocidile' , 2017).

The coup was made in China however, would be carried out in Zimbabwe (Andrew, 2017). Mnangagwa headed for Beijing and was received as a guest of the Chinese government. He was followed by General Chiwenga. It was in Beijing that both men discussed their plans with the Chinese officials. They had both been trained at the Nanjing Military school in China (Andrew, 2017). Mugabe had long refused to mention who his successor was and China was in fear that once he died, the Chinese investments would be threatened. So, China backed the new regime after the coup and told both American and Russian intelligence about the plan (Andrew, 2017). The strategy was activated. A day before the takeover by military, General Chiwenga returned home to Zimbabwe to warn Mugabe against the purges against his wife’s rivals. Grace then threatened to have him fired (Simmons, 2017). The tanks then rolled through the streets of Harare. Grace and Robert Mugabe were placed under house arrest. He however refused to step down, flown out of the country and even being provided security and live a rather quiet life in Zimbabwe. As he is already known to be by the people of Zimbabwe, this man was stubborn. He was very comfortable with his privileges and refused to give them up.

At this point, the generals in Zimbabwe have to adhere to China and America’s request to have no violence and no harming of the Mugabe’s. Grace was thought to have fled to neighbouring country, Namibia. For the first time in living memory, the new military leaders have given permission for a huge march (Malone, 2017). On the 21^st November 2017, Mugabe publicly resigned. Robert Mugabe who ruled Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 and once proclaimed that “only God will remove me” resigned as president (Kerr, 2017).

5. CASE 2: COMPAORE AND SANKARA

Introduction.

In 1945 colonial masters were overall Africa except countries such as Liberia, Ethiopia, South Africa and Egypt ( Laurea,20014) Struggles against colonial domination swept Africa for almost a period of three decades and by 1990 almost all African countries attained independence from colonial rule and were all self-governing countries. As such many African welcomed self-governing with great outlooks and hoped for a bright future. Many had great hope that these countries lighten from the heavy burden of colonialism, would develop rapidly and fully participate in the international community, poverty would be eliminated and diseases would be reduced.

According Laurea (2004), African new leaders hailed in their countries as heroes were believed to have faced the hardest task that is to free the country from the imperialist, all they had to do was to control the political fates of their countries and everything would go on the right direction. Laurea further went on to say that, all those who wished to see post-colonial Africa realized that all these were just illusions, At the decades following independence political and economic instability became continuous elements to all these countries, authoritarian governments spread through the continent, coup d’état and civil wars started to increase numerically. In addition many economies and infrastructures that the Europeans had left collapsed, countries fell into poverty and development became a dream that was never achieved.

In Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara in 1983 after seizing power he led Upper Volta through a revolutionary path that aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in the country. His first act was to baptize the country from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso and started following the footsteps of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who baptized his country from Gold coast to Ghana (Laurea, 2004).

Burkina Faso’s History

Burkina Faso is a land locked country in western Africa which occupies an extensive plateau and its geography is characterized by a savanna that is grassy in the north and gradually gives away to sparse forest in the south. A former French colony, (Brittain, 2007)

Burkina Faso gained independence as Upper Volta in 1960. The name Burkina Faso which means “land of incorruptible people” was adopted in 1984. Burkina Faso is divided into 13 regions and the capital Ouagadougou is in the center of the country and lies about 500 miles from the Atlantic Ocean (Guiguemde & Echenberg, 2017).The history of Burkina Faso is one of the great tragedies of Africa, and, indeed, the world, Burkina Faso was renamed in 1983 from Upper Volta by Thomas Sankara. In 1960 a new constitution was also adopted, unilateral parliament was set up and alongside with a multiparty government (Laurea, 2014).

Thomas Sankara.

“Young, articulate, and charismatic junior army officer of peasant origin with a good general and professional training, Thomas Noel Isidore Sankara typified a new type of African military officer who had not been associated with French colonial ventures and who was fiercely nationalist and particularly sensitive and sympathetic to the needs and aspirations of the African massive specifically that of Burkina Faso” (Martin, 2012, p. 112). Born on December 21, 1949 as in the small town of Yako in central Upper Volta as the territory of Burkina Faso was called than, Thomas Sankara was the first son of his family who enjoyed a relatively privileged position as his father was one of the few Africans functionaries then employed by the colonial state.

In 1966 Sankara joined the military training academy at the age of seventeen stepping into the same career path as that of his father, he was a dedicated student throughout his military training although the physical training was vigorous. As a young man Thomas Sankara served in many positions including that of military recruit, army’s engineering corps, full time Lieutenant and captain of the military (Harsch, 2014).In 1972, Sankara was appointed as a commander of the commando at Po` Base, met one of his best friend Blaise Compaore` in Morocco and they formed up a secrete group called ‘Communist Group Officers’ (Regroupement des officiers communistes, or ROC. In 1974 a brief war broke out between Upper Volta and Mali growing out of a dispute over a contested region stretching nearly 100 miles along their common border. Sankara was among the many send to the border of which he then commanded a small group that staged an ambush and captured some Malian soldiers.

In 1981 as Sankara was appointed captain of the military due to his military command abilities as well as political following and named head of the army’s operational division (Harsch, 2014) He was soon asked to take on a ministerial position in the government in 1982 of which he refused by then but some of his friend were not too happy with that idea and convinced him not to accept it while a few of his friend saw the need for Sankara to take up the position. Sankara later agreed on taking up the offer of which he insisted that his deputy at the commando training center in Po, Blaise Compaore take over as its commander. Laurea (2004) further went on to describe Thomas Sankara as a sensitive, sociable and profound human as well as simple approachable, humorous and nonconformist, she also notes that the Burkinabe people remember him as a just morally upright and sincereleader who generally had the best interest of his people at heart. He was not the head of a state rich in diamond or oil like Libya and South Africa, but only the small, poor and desert Burkina Faso.

Blaise Compaore

Born February 3, 1951 Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, French West Africa now Burkina Faso. Military leader and politician who ruled Burkina Faso from 1987, seizing power from a coup (Harsch,2014).Compaore was born into a family of the Mossi ethnic group, one of the dominant ethnic groups in Upper Volta. He attended military college in Yaoundé, Cameroon and received Para commando training in Rabat Morocco from 1978 to 1981 he served as head of section and later company commandeer in an Upper Volta Para commando regime. Compaore was given charge of the national commando training Centre at Po in 1981. He became fully involved in politics in 1982 when his friend and colleague, Capt. Thomas Sankara resigned from his government post to protest policy decisions. A year later when another power struggle saw Sankara put in prison, Compaore mustered the support of the commando unit at Po and with Ghanaian and Libyan help led a coup on August 4 1983 that installed Sankara as head of state. Along with Compaore and Sankara, two other military officers- Comdt. Jean Baptiste Lingani and Captain Henri Zongo helped organize the coup and the subsequent regime, and all held positions of leadership in the country. Compaore served as minister of state at the presidency (1983-87), essential making him second in command in the regime, and also as minister of state for justice (Harsch, 2014).

Personally quiet and humble, Compaore seemed content to leave the public business of politics in Upper Volta to the more charismatic Sankara and the other two coup organizers.

Thomas Sankara rise to power

In the year that Sankara has been in the military he was not satisfied what most of his compatriots were going through and he needed something to be done. According to Harsch (2014) Sankara on his military training in France 1972 and Morocco 1976 and his visits in Ougadougou he tried to familiarize himself with people that were of the same idea that a radical change must take place in Burkina Faso. In the meanwhile labor union strikes were becoming more frequent and the anger of the lower class population was increasing before the corruption of many elites in the army and civilian bureaucrats. In 1981 while Sayé Zebro was ruling the country, the same year that Sankara was appointed in one of the political position such as that of Minister of information. However Sankara later dismissed from his position on 12 April 1982 as he showed disagreements with the politics of the government (Laurea, 2004).

On 7 November 1982 colonel Somé Yoryan overthrew Sayé Zebro’s government, in this coup d’état junior officers did not participate (Laurea, 2004). Yoryan set a new government coordinated by the council of popular salvation and appointed Jean Baptiste Ouedraogo as president of Upper Volta and on 10 January 1983 Sankara was appointed as prime minister of the Council of Popular Salvation (CPS). As a minister Sankara showed up at cabinet meeting on a bicycle to demonstrate that it is possible to turndown ministerial privileges and benefits especially when people are fighting every day against poverty, hunger and thirst. Laurea (2004) further went on to say that this post gave Sankara the opportunity to come into contact with figure in the international politics; he met with leaders of the Non-Align movement, including Fidel Castro, Samora Machel and Maurice Bishop. Sankara’s anti-imperialist stance and his popularity spoiled his relations with the conservative elements within the CSP, including President Ouédraogo. His invitation of Muammar Ghaddafi in Burkina Faso, in February 1983, was the flash that triggered the next coup d’état. On 17 May, Sankara was dismissed as prime minister and arrested. It was believed that after his arrested the country would restore political stability. Far from that, Sankara’s removal triggered a series of protest. On 20 and 21 May violent protests conducted by students, trade unionists, workers, and people from the poor neighborhood Sankara was thus released at the end of the month, but was soon rearrested (Laurea, 2004).

On 4 August 1983 Blaise Compaore and 250 soldiers of his forces in Po overthrew the government of Ouegraogo in a coup d’état and announcing Sankara as head of state. A soon as Sankara became head of state he drafted an economic development plan with aim of achieving self-sufficiency in the country in order to improve the life of the Burkinabe and women. He declared that his aim was to achieve an economy independent, self-sufficient and planned at the service of a democratic popular society (Laurea, 2004).

How Blaise Compaore toppled Thomas Sankara.

In 1983 Sankara and his friends including Blaise Compaore held a coup that overthrew Ouegadraogo. The National Council of the Revolution (CNR) a regime by that time formed by Sankara enjoyed a strong popular support from various leftist factions, movements and organizations both within the army and among the civilian population. The Sankara’s revolution was one of the greatest attempts at popular democratic freedom in post-independence Africa and is considered a new experience of broad economic, social, cultural and political transformation. According to Dembélé (2013) Sankara’s true indigenous development was based upon a number of principles among them, (a) the need of relying on one’s own strength, (b) mass participation in politics with the goal of changing ones conditions in life, (c) the liberation of women and their presence in the process of development, (d) the use of the state as an instrument for economic and social transformation.

These principles formed the basis of the policies implemented by Sankara and his comrades between 1983 and 1987. On the other hand the main objectives of the Sankaras revolution was to increase quality of life of the population on the other hand to reduce the economic dependence of Burkina Faso on foreign aid and to fight against corruption of the political class (Laurea, 2004).

Various leftist political parties were integrated into the CNR and on May 17, 1986 (Martin, 1993) the original members of the CNR issued a combined declaration stating that all existing political parties should be dissolved in favor of a common front political organization. As a result, functional conflict developed within the CNR coalition between the Marxist and other leftist element on the one hand and the military on the other hand. On this process Sankara and his group became increasingly isolated both within the CNR and in the army.

Martin (1993) further went on to say that a union of radical groups that consisted of army officers, trade unionists, and members of small opposition groups, the Sankara regime slowly lost most of its popular support as power became concentrated in the hands of a few military officers the most of which were Blaise Compaoré. Well known as the right hand man of Comrade President Sankara, Minister of State Blaise Compaoré who was one of the members of the Communist Officer’s Group, and studied with President Sankara at the military academy, where he was very important in the planning of the revolution that brought the current government to power. Compaoré repeatedly proved himself as someone who understands the dealings of the state at the highest levels and was considered an important friend and ally of the President.

Popular support continued to decline therefore leading to a military coup on October 15, 1987 which overthrew and killed Sankara, an armed group with twelve other officials were also killed in this coup organized by his former colleague Blaise Compaoré. Decline in relations with neighboring countries was one of the reasons given, with Compaoré stating that Sankara risked foreign relations with former colonial power France and neighboring Ivory, Blaise used this as a way to topple Thomas Sankara and then install himself as head of state. Whatever the nature or extent of foreign involvement in the coup, the most fascinating and troubling evidence pointed out to domestic forces. Not onliy were the immediate offenders Burkinabe but they came from among Sankara’s collaboration in the CNR, government and military (Harsh, 2014).

Based on literature presented above, it evident that Sankara was assassinated by elements supporting Blaisé Compaoré with the help of external forces which were against Sankara’s national domestic policies. This is due to the fact that Sankara’s policies were geared towards limiting the influence of the western countries especially former colonial rulers (France) who were using international bodies such as the World Bank to suppress African and other developing countries. Blaisé Compaoré used the opportunities presented by external forces to betray his friend Sankara to seize power in Burkina Faso using the same mechanism military coup which brought Sankara in power.

In 1987 Compaoré took power (Smith & Alex, 2014) at the head of a trio that included Zongo and Lingani. However, as time went on, Lingani and Zongo disagreed with Compaoré about economic reform issues, and in 1989 they were accused of plotting to overthrow him. The two were arrested and quickly executed, and Compaoré continued to pursue his political agenda. In 1991 a new constitution was communicated and Compaoré was elected president in an election that was ditched by opposition candidates.Compaoré was re-elected in 1998, 2005, and 2010. His regime, however, was not without opposition or debate. Unpopular political and economic developments and the suspicious death in 1998 of Norbert Zongo, a well-known journalist known for speaking out against Compaoré’s administration, contributed to periodic episodes of social and political unrest that continued into the 2000s. In October 2003 several people were arrested and accused of planning a coup to oust Compaoré.

Meanwhile, economic troubles were worsened by the civil war that had begun in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (Debbie, 2006). The conflict disrupted an important source of trade for Burkina Faso as well as the livelihoods of several hundred thousand Burkinabé who had found work there. Compaoré’s administration also faced public discontent over high living costs which lead to riots in February 2008, weeks of protests, and a general strikes. Debbie (2006) also points out that Burkina Faso has always struggled with democracy it was in January 1966, that one of the first popular uprisings in a post-colonial African country took place. In the years that followed this uprising, political parties and civil society organizations have violently resisted all attempts to limit political pluralism, as well individual and collective rights and freedoms.

There is, therefore, a democratic tradition that was certainly affected by the succession of military regimes but has remained a constant element in the political culture the popular uprising of 30 and 31 October 2014(Frere & Engelbert, 2015) which ended the rule of President Compaoré, has certainly opened up new possibilities in this area. The transitional government that followed thereafter, on 13 March 2015, set up a National Commission for Reconciliation and Reforms, one of whose tasks was to propose constitutional reforms. At the end of its work, the Commission submitted an initial draft constitution and proposed that it be turned into a draft and submitted to the people at the same time as the municipal elections in 2016.

Nevertheless, the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Burkina Faso is a long process, sometimes thrown with obstacles, as all the forces of the old regime have not been completely disarmed (Santiso, 2002). Even though the future of the young constitutional democracy is a promising one in view of the transformations undertaken since the popular uprising, this process remains uncertain.

6. CASE 3: LUMUMBA AND MOBUTU SESE SEKO

A brief history of Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo formally called Belgium Congo under the Belgium government. The Congo under the rule of King Leopold II was called the kingdom of Congo. Belgium was the ultimate colony master having exploited the land in the early 1800s. During the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, the Belgium government decided to rule the Congo Free State (Berlin Conference, 1884-85). On 15^thNovember, 1908 the Belgium Senate decided to take over fully and rule the administration of the country (Kisangani & Bobb, 2010). The transfer of power took place without ceremony, Belgium at once took measures to ensure a fair and enlightened administration of its new colony, in real agreement with the high humanitarian principles that Leopold II had never ceased to profess, but had been unable to bring into practice.

After an uprising by the people of Congo, the colonial master Belgium decided to give the country its independence in 1960. Its independence marked the beginning of a new uprising for the people. Patrice Lumumba was the First Prime Minister of the country after attaining its independence on 30th June, 1960 under the rule of President Joseph Kasavubu (Forbath, 1977). The state was unstable because of tribal and ethnic difference. Prime Minister had tried to restore peace. It was in 1965, that Joseph Mobutu commander in Chief of the army decided to seize power from its President and renamed the state Zaire. Laurent-Desire Kabila then took over the state after Mobutu had ruled for 32 years and renamed it The Democratic Republic of Congo (Bustin, 2002).

Background: Joseph Mobutu

Mobutu Sese Seko, also called Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, original name Joseph Mobutu, born October 14, 1930, Lisala, Belgian Congo (now Democratic Republic of the Congo). He died on September 7, 1997, Rabat, Morocco, He was married to Bobi Ladawa and had many children. His father was a cook, his name was Albéric Gbemani he died when Mobutu was a child and his mother Marie Madeleine Yemo, was a maid in a hotel. She used her earnings to send him to a Christian brother’s schools, the Capuchins and Scheutists where he was later expelled, on the grounds of disciplinary action he was conscripted into the army and he rose to a sergeant. He got the highest position a Zararian could get at that time (Danisezewski & Simmions, 1997). Emmanuel (2015) elaborates that Mobutu stayed on that position for seven years, leaving to become a newspaper reporter in Léopoldville (now Kinshasa). After his discharge in 1956 he became a reporter for the daily The Future and later editor of the weekly Actualités Africaines. In 1958, Mobutu went to Brussels with a large contingent of Zairians who were exhibited at the Brussels World Exposition as examples of Belgian colonial achievement. In 1959, he revisited Brussels and secured an apprenticeship in the colonial propaganda agency, Inforcongo. This post also gave him opportunities for advanced study in Brussels.

Mobutu had contact with both the Belgians and the CIA from an younger age, he was part of the generation that had relations with the colonialists, after they saw prospects of independence looming they had to create a group of elites (Thomson, 2010) who would take over after they were removed from power, Emmanuel (2015) makes a similar observation when he states;

Mobutu continued to live in Brussels and was sought out by diplomatic, intelligence, and financial interests, who were making contact with Zairian nationals in Belgium as the prospect for early independence loomed. Mobutu made contacts among financiers, the CIA, Zairian students, and Belgian security forces during this period.

Mobutu attended the Round Table Conferences in Brussels that considered the coming independence for the Congo. He had developed a friendship with Lumumba that began in 1957 and was named head of the MNC/L office in Brussels. He returned to Zaire only three weeks before independence (Zeilig & Seddon, 2007).

He was President of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) he seized power in a 1965 coup and ruled for some 32 years before being ousted in a rebellion in 1997. In 1949 he joined the Force Publique, an internal security force of Congolese troops but with Belgium officers. Given such a background of not growing without a father we can see that it influenced his future actions during his totalitarian political system where he slaughtered people, made a lot of assassinations and many other atrocities against humanity. Most notable of the atrocities he committed during his 32 year reign where, the massacre of citizens in December 1990, the Kasavubu bridge massacre, the Idiofa slaughter, students slaughter in 1969 and various political assassinations (Ikambana, 2007). These were signs to show that Mobutu was a ruthless man and his rule was denoted to that of a vampire state (Thomson, 2010).

Joseph Mobutu: Rise to power

On November 25, 1965, Army General Joseph Mobutu seized power after a bloodless coup d’état which overthrew the first elected government in the aftermath of the country’s independence. General Mobutu justified his military coup by claiming he wanted to restore peace and national unity (Emmanuel, 2015). This peaceful revolution as Mobutu described it, was targeted at civilian politicians who would now be given a cooling-off period. He explained that a group of the Congo’s first university graduates would replace the elected government; they would form his ‘College of Commissioners.’ The coup leader gave Soviet personnel 48 hours to leave (Zeilig, 2008). This was of remarkable significance, it was a time of change in the alignment of the Cold War as Mobutu was pro-Western and now Congo was to be a stronghold of the USA for the next 32 years and Ikambana, (2007), argues that this led to open political conflict between President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba. In 1967, Mobutu abolished the national Constitution and established a new Loi Fondamentale, which inaugurated the single-party system and made him the country’s chief strongman. He installed a totalitarian political system that systematically eliminated political opponents. A totalitarian system is a philosophical, political, or ideological system that controls the totality of the national life by exercising a monopoly of power and imposing a unique vision of the world. It is a system characterized by five key elements:

(a) An inclusive ideology; (b) A single party responsible for disseminating ideology to the masses; (c) A powerful leader who controls the application of the ideology; (d) A very organized secret police under the leader’s control; and (e) The control of mass media, the military, and every single social, economic, and cultural- political organization.

These where deliberations meant to capture the state and have full control of the Congolese State. From the social cast, to the economical welfare of the state where we are told state funds were deposited in Mobutu’s and his cronies’ personal banks. Most notably was the control of the political arena in which he suffocated basic human rights e.g. right to expression, right to association and even the right to life. His rule was heavily influenced with corruption and economic exploitation which made his tenure to be coined a ‘Kleptocracy’ (Acemoglu et al, 2004).

Background: Patrice Emery Lumumba

Patrice Emery Lumumba led the struggle for the independence of the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and he became the country’s first prime minister. Lumumba was born on 2 July 1925 in the region of Onalua, Central Kasai province of the then Belgian Congo. (Coger, 1961). He was son of Francois Tolenga and Juliana Amatu. In the course of his primary and secondary education, Lumumba became familiar with the writings of Karl Marx and Jean-Paul Sartre, Which shaped his political ideas. He worked for eleven years for the Belgian colonial service in the Congo, primarily in the post-office. As a member of the educated elite, Lumumba began writing and agitating for the Congolese anti-colonial movement; he wrote articles for various anticolonial publications and was also active in a number of professional organizations. In 1958, Lumumba travelled to Accra, Ghana to participate in the All-African Peoples Conference (AAPC) convened by Kwame Nkrumah (Martin, 2012).

From 1944 Lumumba intensified his efforts to improve his education. He had left Onalua with only rudimentary schooling, and still struggled to write and express himself in French. Stanleyville tantalized him with its possibilities; of work but also self-improvement. There was an array of courses taught in colleges and schools, as well as a library that gave him an opportunity that he had never before had to study and read. So began his lifelong obsession with reading. Whenever he could not be found it was fair to assume that he was buried in a book in the public library.

Lumumba had a keen sense of the struggle he faced to ‘improve’ himself. This effort at self-education was a defining one. (Zeilig, 2008) quotes a letter Patrice wrote to his friend Emile Luhahi in 1954 in which he reflected on the plans he still had to pursue further learning.

You asked me about my future and my projects … I have many projects which are centred on one ideal: to have a thorough education … because for me wealth has no value. I prefer to have a competent education than to be rich, ignorant. Whether I go to university or not, I have to divide myself into four parts to become a man relatively informed to better serve my homeland. At college they only give us instruments, it is my responsibility to use these instruments in a way that they can become precious tools. What are these instruments? It is a basic knowledge that we were taught on our school benches…

I can affirm, dear Emile, that one can become a true college man, that is to say acquire a quasi-university training – if not at university – even staying at home … What is my educational experience? Certainly you know it … It is certainly thanks to my own effort, my perfectionism, my perseverance.

Today even Europeans characterise me as formidable. A European friend said to me one day: ‘In European circles everyone says Lumumba wants to impose his intellectual superiority as much on the Congolese as the whites’. This idea comes from burning polemics that I have had with the Europeans, polemics for which I have come out victorious. Here in Stan, all the Congolese take me for a magician …the Europeans take me for a man of superior education. Lots of Europeans, including my Head of Department, asserts that I am better educated than many Europeans.

As you know since last year it has been a question whether I pursue my education at university. I was admitted to the University of Kimuenza … but … there is not yet accommodation for married students – I will have to divorce so I can become single!!! … Anyway I have not lost confidence. Either I will go to university, or I will enrol in courses by correspondence for the same kind of studies, this is what I have already started … at the Centre of Higher Studies in Brussels.

This zeal to learn was the cornerstone to Lumumba’s rise in the political corridors of Congo, as he was intelligent and had well-articulated ideas which he captured from the reading of books. Lumumba became a household name in Congolese politics as he was full of socialist ideas which were meant to empower every person in the Country.

Tracing the historical relationship of Patrice Emery Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko

Given the small timeline between the first time they met and Independence Day. The events that transpired were of greater importance as they exhibited how Lumumba and Mobutu got to know each other and became very close allies. During such a limited timeframe we ought to see that these two young man became great associates. This was noted through Lumumba letting Mobutu to represent him when he was absent, some scholars even subscribe to the thought that Lumumba was nurturing his successor in Mobutu who was 5 years younger than him.

Lumumba made contact with the most important movers and shakers in the world of Léopoldville’s politics. He met people who he had known before only by reputation. Many of these people were going to be caught up in the occurrence of events leading up to independence. Zeilig (2008) states Josephs, Ileo and Mobutu were some of the important people Lumumba befriended. The latter he met for the first time in the office of the newspaper The Future .He made a strong impression on Lumumba; he spoke excellent French and soon became one of Lumumba’s most loyal supporters. Mobutu admitted years later that he had fallen under the spell of Lumumba’s idealism and was educated in Lumumba’s school. The former, Ileo, became one of the founders of the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) that would help lead the struggle to independence; he was also an important member of the Educated Elites community in the capital. Lumumba immediately forced himself onto the political scene of the capital. Martin (2012) asserts that Michel Djunga, a friend of Lumumba at the time recalled his sharp intelligence, He read a newspaper in a flash. He was informed on everything.

In 1960 Mobutu represented Lumumba at the Brussels Round Table Conference on Congo independence until the release of Lumumba, who had been jailed for his nationalist activities in the Congo in 1959 after a riot broke out which made him imprisoned for six months. During the conference, Mobutu supported Lumumba’s proposals (which were adopted) for a strongly centralized state for the independent Congo. A protégé of Lumumba in the Mouvement National Congolais, Mobutu had experience as a journalist and had ranked as a sergeant in the headquarters of the old Force Publique. Emmanuel (2015), depicts how Lumumba and Mobutu were closer to each other in the following statement;

In June 1960 he was promoted to secretary of state in Lumumba’s cabinet. In the bedlam of independence, Mobutu owed his rise to the prime minister, who had lifted him to a colonelcy. Although Victor Lundula got the command of the ANC, Lumumba had wanted Mobutu for this job.

Soon after independence there were huge demonstrations within the army calling for a Congolese commander, this prompted the newly elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to summon Janssens, who tried to insist that Belgian soldiers should be brought in from bases in Kamina and Kitona to teach the rebels a lesson. Lumumba refused, he did the opposite and immediately gave each soldier a promotion in rank. On 6 July he dismissed Janssens. The old name Force Publique, associated so closely with colonial violence, was also replaced. From now on the army would be known as the Congolese National Army .Quickly the Belgian chief of staff was replaced, and Victor Lundula appointed commander-in-chief, with Joseph Desire Mobutu, a former soldier in the Force Publique, becoming his deputy. Emmanuel (2015) further exhibits the good relationship between Lumumba and Mobutu;

During his time as the Prime Minister he could dispatch the army under the command of Mobutu Sese Seko to silent secessionists’ movements in Katanga and they also quashed the rebellions in Kisai this was in response to declaration of Independence by the two Provinces.

These are some of the events that pivoted the status that Mobutu and Lumumba were allies and Mobutu was loyal to his master as he could execute his duties overwhelmingly without any hesitation.

The secessions in Congo, Patrice Lumumba made some uninformed decisions, he turned his attention to the same people who were baying for his blood, the USA and this resulted in his humiliation as a leader, (Zeilig, 2008) gives a brief explanation of what happened on his uninvited trip to the United States in America;

Due to secessions in Congo’s richest province (Katanga), Patrice Lumumba board a plane to the United States of America with the sole purpose of getting military assistance to calm the situation in Congo, however it can be noted that he received a hostile reception there, United States of America President Eisenhower refused to see him, he regarded Patrice Lumumba as a lost man to the soviets.

It is also relevant to note that the trip to the United States of America was a double edged sword, firstly it depicted Lumumba as an incompetent and indecisive leader as he went back to his enemies and secondly the result of the trip was Lumumba going back to soviet support which did not go well with his domestic ally Mobutu.

Due to Lumumba’s actions of asking help from The Soviets this gave the USA a definitive reason to remove him from power under the leadership of Mobutu who was a USA puppet. By mid-August 1960, the Americans began to hatch a plan to replace the prime minister with a coup. This was the defining moment, this was the moment historical allies turned into villains.

Historical allies become villains: the assassination of Patrice Emery Lumumba

The assassination of Patrice Lumumba was an epitome of how historical allies have become villains. Kujat (1998) notes that it is the military’s role in every democratically elected government to safeguard the national interest of a given country. This is done by defending the country from external threats as well as internal threats. That being said it was Joseph Mobutu’s constitutional duty to defend his Prime Minister during a time of crisis they were in since he was the Chief of Staff of the Congolese defense. Because of lust for power and greed for money Mobutu’s ignorance triumphed. It is for this reason that Joseph Mobutu is deemed a betrayer, he holds a lion’s share among those who orchestrated Patrice Lumumba death. Nevertheless it will be an academic injustice to give a blind eye to the role played by external powers for example the USA’s CIA, Belgium and Britain. The role of the external powers is deemed the last stroke on an already cracking back of the Congolese situation, this will be exhibited at the end.

Joseph Mobutu’s Role

On the evening of September 14, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army, announced that the army was assuming control until 31 December, 1960, through a bloodless coup, that the existing central political organs were suspended and that the government of the country would be carried on by a college of young university men, this was done because Mobutu knew that he did not had the power base to rule the country directly and securely. On the 20^th of September Colonel Joseph Mobutu announced the establishment of Commissioners-General, and on the same day the head of state issued an ordinance to that effect giving legislative and executive powers ordinarily exercised by the government and parliament to the Commissioners-General (Bustin, 2002). They ran the country until the 9^th of February 1961 when the Commissioners-General was dissolved and replaced by a Provisional Government under the leadership of Mr. lleo.

Patrice Lumumba was arrested by the gendarmerie on the order of Colonel Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the army. But he was released by the Army command in circumstances which remain unknown. Mobutu’s loyalty seemed to be only an initial appearance. After the June declaration of independence. Coger (1961) postulates that Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu had a power struggle, Lumumba wanted to oust Kasavubu and Kasavubu wanted to remove Lumumba. In addition, Lumumba had many enemies, including western countries like the United States and Belgium, for his nationalist and pro-Soviet stance that threatened foreign interest in the Congolese economy, specifically, diamond, cobalt, and copper. On September, Kasavubu and Lumumba’s rivalry reached in its apex and this was due to Congo having to centers of power which does not always work in government setups. Given such a political environment, Mobutu saw a chance to gain power and so with the pretext of imposing political stability, launched a coup. Kasavubu cooperated with Mobutu, On the other hand, Lumumba negatively reacted on the coup and became furious to what it seemed betrayal of Mobutu. Allegedly, Mobutu took part in the eventual assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, Mobutu had contributed to Lumumba's death after his troops captured and flew him to Katanga. Lumumba called for media coverage to show how he was abused because of his stand on what he believed in (Young, 1985). In January of 1961, a firing squad executed Lumumba, allegation of foreign involvement surfaced later on.

Lumumba was sent first on the 3^rd of December 1960 to Thysville military barracks Camp Hardy, 150km from Leopoldville. He was accompanied by Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito, two political associates who had planned to assist him setting up a new government. They were malnourished by the prison guards as per Mobutu’s orders (Sherer and Lindsey, 2015). After the demise of Lumumba, Mobutu restored Kasavubu to his position. But political instability continued especially in 1964. In order to lessen the call for independence of those in the Katanga region, President Kasavubu made the secessionist leader Moise Tshombe as his new Prime Minister.

External Power’s Role (CIA, UN, Britain and Belgium)

One has to not that many factors that led the assassination of Patrice Lumumba apart from Mobutu’s role we see the hand of external powers carrying some weight in the act that brought misery not only to the Congolese but to Africa as well and the world at large. To talk of Patrice Lumumba’s death without mentioning the role played by the CIA, UN, Britain and Belgium would be unfair as these are there forces behind the post-Independence chaos that rocked Congo of its deservedly won Independence. Patrice Lumumba was more of a pawn in the chess game between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. This was due to his rise that coincidentally came during the early years of the devastating Cold War and there was a fight between these two big powers for a race on geo-political strategic. Given such a background Patrice Lumumba was more inclined to the Soviets, he was often termed a communist and this made him a liability to the United States political position in Africa (Kalb, 1982) and the CIA codenamed him ‘satan’ (Coger, 1961) depicting the extent to which they hated him. Hence by all means the CIA and its allies had to dispose Lumumba through any means possible.

External powers activities to assassinate Lumumba were embedded on self-interest, all they wanted was the exploitation of Mineral rich Congo and Lumumba was seen as a huge obstacle which had to be removed, this is exhibited by Signh, (2016) when he states that;

As early as October, 1960, Belgians had agreed with CIA officials that the elimination of Lumumba was essential to have access to Congo's minerals. On 6th October, Count d'Aspremont Lynden sent a cable to Elizabethville, the capital of the seceded province of Katanga a clear policy of elimination definitive of Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba’s request for Soviet help resulted in extreme concern in US policy circles bordering on paranoia.

(Signh, 2016) postulates that the CIA station officer in Leopoldville, Victor Hedgman cabled the following report to CIA headquarters during the period August-September 1960:

Embassy and station believe Congo experiencing classic communist effort takeover government. Many forces at work here: Soviets Communist Party, although difficult determine major influencing factors to predict outcome struggle for power, decisive period not far off. whether or not Lumumba actually commie or just playing commie game to assist his solidifying power, anti-west forces rapidly increasing power Congo and there may be little time left in which take action (to avoid another Cuba. (CIA cable, Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60).

This is a clear indication that the CIA was heavily involved and played a crucial role in the death of Patrice Lumumba. The CIA was by all means trying to make sure that Congo becomes a western ally, they did not want a repetition to what happened to Cuba which was by now a Soviet stronghold. Given such a scenario, Lumumba’s actions and many other factors Lumumba had to be removed from the picture.

According to the Church Committee Report, the CIA Special Group held a meeting on August 26, 1960 which decided that all options were on the table for Lumumba’s removal. On the next day on August 26, 1960, who had attended the meeting cabled to the CIA station officer in Leopldville that:

Removal (Lumumba’s) must be an urgent and prime objective a high priority of our covert action. You can act on your own authority where time does not permit referral here. (CIA cable, Dulles to station officer, 8/26/60).

The assassination of Lumumba being urgent as exhibited in the above CIA cable, it is crystal clear that Lumumba was an obstacle to the CIA motor of taking over Congo, it is also noteworthy that Lumumba was just a pawn in a chess game between USA and the Soviet Union which culminated as the Cold War. Kalb (1982) clearly elaborate that, with the eminence to remove Lumumba a top scientist was sent to Congo equipped with a kit containing an exotic poison designed to produce a fatal disease indigenous to the area. This lethal substance, he informed the station chief, was meant for Patrice Lumumba, the recently ousted pro-Soviet Prime Minister of the Congo, who had a good chance of returning to power. The poison, the scientist said, was somehow to be slipped into Lumumba's food, or perhaps into his toothpaste. Poison was not the only acceptable method; any form of assassination would do, so long as it could not be traced back to the United States Government. Signh, (2016) postulates that the actions by the CIA were not the usual work that they carry out this is indicated when he alludes;

Pointing out that assassination was not exactly a common C.I.A. tactic, the station chief asked who had authorized the assignment. The scientist indicated that the order had come from the highest authority from Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States. It was from this information that a CIA accepted during the deposition before the Senate’s Church Committee, the CIA accepted that it cooperated with the Congolese government in closing possible avenues of escape by Lumumba on the day of his final escape attempt.

The CIA going off their usual operations, was an indication of how desperate they were in stopping Lumumba and also the fact that the President of the United States of America a democratic country could spearhead such an illicit operation that threatened another country’s sovereignty. This also was done secretly so as the United States could not be pointed in wake of any investigations to the death of Patrice Lumumba.

The United Nations troops did nothing to help Lumumba, all that they were saying was they had no legal authority to protect him and this shows that there was no will to protect Lumumba who had earlier appealed to the United Nations for assistance. Zeilig (2008) makes the following objections on the events that transpired;

The UN also played an important part in Lumumba’s fall. The organization was not immune from the imperial objectives of some of its powerful member states, nor was it simply an empty vessel to be filled by the unequal weight of its affiliates. The international organization was an important actor in the events that were unfolding in the Congo. While it is clear that soon after independence, the US, France, Britain and Belgium discussed the definitive elimination of Lumumba, no longer simply his political elimination, similar views and plans were held by senior members of the UN hierarchy.

This is a clear indication that the United Nations was reluctant, not because they could not save Lumumba but because they were acting under directions from the Western countries as shown above. This brings this paper to question the legitimacy of United Nations on being an International Organization as it acted in a way that was only favorable to the Western countries. These frivolous actions by the United Nations led to the death of Patrice Lumumba and by so doing robbed Congo of its first democratically elected leader.

On 17 January Lumumba was flown to Elisabethville with two fellow prisoners Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito. Already beaten and tortured he was dragged by Katangan forces commanded by a Belgian, to Villa Brouwe, here he was tortured again, as Tshombe decided how to kill him. Later in the evening they were thrown into a military vehicle and driven to a nearby wood. A Belgian officer assembled and commanded three firing squads, while another Belgian organised the execution site. Patrice Lumumba and his two comrades, Mpolo and Okito, were shot one after the other, Tshombe was present (Coger, 1961). Then Gerard Soete, a Belgian police officer, unearthed the bodies from their shallow grave, chopped each body into pieces and then dissolved them with canisters of acid. When there was no more acid remaining the body parts were burnt. The bloody deed was done and independence had finally been broken. It was only after a month this ordeal was announced to the Public on the 13^th of February the same year and the news was met with grief.

Lumumba’s death was a blow to the wave of Independence that swept across Africa during that time and he was a hero to many Congolese people, he was a martyr of the struggle who was killed for his belief of an Independent Congo, an Independent Africa. He will always be remembered in his last words to the people of Congo. (Lierde, 1972) quotes the letter addressed to his wife;

But what we wish for our country, its right to an honorable life, to a spotless dignity, to an independence without restrictions.

These powerful words echo sentiments of a man of faith, a man who saw the light at the end of the tunnel. Today Patrice Lumumba is the face of an African struggle and he continues to inspire billions of Africans to this day though he lived a short life.

7. SIMILARITIES

As we analyzed the contemporary African philosophy of these various scenarios of African political leaders namely Patrice Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko, Blaise Compaore and Thomas Sankara ,Emmerson Mnangagwa and Robert Mugabe and their respective countries Congo, Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso. The greatest similarity that the mentioned political leaders have is that they wanted freedom from their colonizers and most political leaders in Africa were tired of the countless oppression and exploitation from the colonizers, these were their major aim.

One of the key similarities that these former and current head of states from different countries in Africa have, is the foundation of being from the political party that has led the liberation struggles during the colonial era. Patrice Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko were both from the Mouvement National Congolais party. Former President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe and current president Emmerson Mnangagwa were from the same party ZANU-PF.

Patrice Lumumba former and first prime minister of Congo was one of the founder of the Movement National Congolais .The aims of the party were to gain independence, gradual africanization of the government and economic development. Former president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe was also the first prime minister in 1980 of Zimbabwe. He was also one of the founding fathers of the party ZANU-PF. Robert Mugabe and Patrice Lumumba had the privilege to get high positions in the government after they had won the liberation struggle with the help of their patriotic political party members. Thomas Sankara was a prime minister in January 1983 but was later dismissed. These political parties liberated their countries from the colonial oppressors and their founders replaced the colonisers in high government positions.

Not all of the leaders who were prime ministers or held government positions, there are some who were more involved physically in the struggle to liberate their people. Emmerson Mnangagwa before coming into presidency, was a guerilla leader which meant he had a position in the military. After the independence President Emmerson Mnangagwa held a series of senior cabinet positions including minister of state security this gave him a contact with the military. Besides Thomas Sankara being a prime minister then rose to presidency, he was a military officer. He went to a military school growing up, which enabled him to go up the ranks in the military. Blaise Compaore was also an army captain, which was all thanks to Thomas Sankara after being appointed in power. Besides being an army captain he also went to military school which is where they met with Thomas Sankara at a training school.

During their struggle for liberation Emerson Mnangangwa, Robert Mugabe and Patrice Lumumba were arrested for their causes. Congo, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso had presidents that clanged to power for a very long time. They used their power to their own benefit and practiced clients .During their time in power they used force and assassinated those who objected or were a threat to their rule. For example the series of massacre of the Ndebele tribe in Bulawayo by the former President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe which is called the Gukurahundi. This massacre was done to get rid of the Ndebele’s because they were of the same tribe and party as Joshua Nkomo who had become a rivalry to Mugabe.

Similarly in his obsession for military victory in Katanga and facing another secession in south Kasai the main source of the Congo’s diamond riches, Patrice Lumumba took the fateful decision to ask the soviet union for immediate military assistance ,this resulted in the massacre of hundreds of tribesmen and the flight of a quarter of a million refugees. These three African countries have values and ideologies which were built from the foundation of Pan Africanism. These ideologies and values were basically unity in the country; politically, economically and socially. The masses who believed in this ideology followed their respective anti colonialism movements.

Zimbabwe’s former president Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso believed in left wing politics, which considers the good of all men. Robert Mugabe promoted the socialist ideology as he strongly believed in socialism.

After independence these African leaders who found the liberating political parties and their fellow comrades had inner party disputes and different ideologies on management of state issues, as well as corruption. This resulted in coup detat, friends began turning on each other for power. Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore were friends close friends in the military, but when Sankara went into power he began to lose the support from the people who brought him into power because of his decisions which favored the masses. In comparison Robert Mugabe had ideas and decisions that other party members did not like, such as his wife succeeding him after he gives up power. Emerson Mnangangwa was one of those who were against the idea of Grace Mugabe being Robert’s successor, this led to the takeover by the support of the army.

Patrice Lumumba may have not been a president, but he had used his Prime Minister position to the extent that his own party members so him as a threat. This led to him being executed by his own friend Thomas Sankara.In conclusion these countries presidents have been popularly known for clinging into power. Robert Mugabe has been power for 37years since independence, Blaise Campaore was in power for 27 years in power after the takeover from Sankara and Mobutu served for 31 years.

8. DIFFERENCES

A few comparative differences exist between the three scenarios of the contemporary African leaders namely Mobutu Sese Seko versus Patrice Lumumba, Blaise Campaore versus Thomas Sankara and Emerson Mnangagwa versus Robert Mugabe, within the three African states of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe respectively. Exploring the differences will establish how the leaders turned from friends to foes within the context of their unique circumstances and explain why these differences are a crucial expect of the overall intent of this paper. To begin our expedition on highlighting and contrasting the major differences between these rivalries it is important to note that these three scenarios though similar by face value hold a lot of variances by closer inspection.

To start with, although the manner in which these slain leaders were deposed by their political allies turned rivals was mostly through brutal means, only Patrice Lumumba and Thomas Sankara were removed by the barrel of a gun. Patrice Lumumba (DRC) was assassinated on 17 January 1961, while Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso) died in a hail of bullets on 15 October 1987 correspondingly. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was however sparred by his political rival(s) and was only forced to resign most recently in late 2017. Although many political analysts and pundits alike have argued that the latter’s removal is tantamount to a de facto coup, seeing as that the Zimbabwe Defense Force (ZDF) played a major role in his removal, Mugabe’s unceremonious exit from power did not result in his death (Roessler, 2017).

This presents another difference between the three scenarios; the similarity between Lumumba and Sankara’s deaths has inspired arguments from scholars and pundits alike that in both successful assassination plots of these two leaders, foreign powers or elements played a role in their political deaths. In the case of Lumumba, the heinous crime of the charismatic leader of post-colonial Congo is claimed to be a culmination of two inter-related assassination plots by American and Belgian governments, which used Congolese accomplices and a Belgian execution squad to carry out the deed (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2011). In the case of Sankara, it is commonly accepted that Burkina Faso’s former head of state, Blaise Compaore, ordered Sankara’s assassination after their once close relationship soured (Keita, 2017).

For years however numerous theories have also been linking foreign elements to Sankara’s death, these include Liberian rebels under the instruction of convicted war criminal and former Liberian president Charles Taylor, France and, late presidents Felix Houphouet Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. ( Waters & Prairie, 2007) Both foreign and domestic elements are implicated in Sankara and Lumumba’s removal from power via their brutal assassinations. The removal from power of Mugabe however is widely believed to have only involved his former political aides from within his ZANU-PF party and the military or bluntly, domestic elements. These include Emmerson Mnangagwa (his former Vice President of both Party and State) and commander of the defence forces, General Constantine Chiwenga (Pigou, 2017).

Another difference between the three scenarios is that the removal of Mugabe from power was seen to be highly supported and endorsed by the citizens of his country. As news spread that Mugabe had resigned from the presidency after nearly four-decade of ruling the once prosperous nation, large crowds gathered in the capital Harare and across the country, taking to the streets to celebrate the unlikely turn of events. In this instance the ZDF, particularly General Chiwenga, became somewhat of a hero in the eyes of the people. Unlike in Burkina Faso and the DRC where Sankara and Lumumba’s removal from power through their subsequent assassinations were met with shock and dismay and in both instances, large crowds gathered to either mourn or express their anger towards the tragic turn of events that met their most beloved leaders.

Both Sankara and Lumumba were charismatic populists who died with their generally well perceived reputations intact, unlike Mugabe who before the end of his rule, was highly conceived to be the villain behind his country’s agonising economic woes. (Winter, 2017) Sanakara for one is celebrated and often remembered with deep sorrow among people who are familiar with his pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist ideology (Sankarism). (Ouedraogo, 2016) In Congo, the assassination of Lumumba is, for good reason, considered the ‘original sin’ of the country. Occurring less than seven months after independence (30th June 1960), it was a stumbling block for ideals of national unity, economic independence, and the African solidarity for which Lumumba had advocated, as well as being a terrible blow to the hopes for freedom and material prosperity of millions of Congolese people (Jacobs & Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2013).

It is also worth noting between the three scenarios that only Thomas Sankara, then 33 years of age, came into power by means of a coup which he orchestrated with Compaore in 1983 (Compaore later toppled Sankara in the same fashion). Mugabe and Lumumba on the other hand, although staunch advocates against colonialism, with the former being the recognized voice of the guerrilla movement, came into power through democratic elections. Mugabe won a resounding victory in the new country’s election to become prime minister in 1980 after British-brokered peace talks in 1979 that established the independent state of Zimbabwe and set the stage for a national election (Bromwich, 2017).

9. LESSONS AND REFLECTIONS

Lessons and Reflections are of great impetus after all has been said and done. Lessons present to us what we can learn out of a situation that have just taken place be it positive or negative. Equally important to lessons are reflections, these give insights and can lead to further learning of a particular situation. From the comprehensive outline of events elaborated above we ought to see the plot taking twists and turns in bringing out many themes from these three distinct situations, some of the themes that are brought out include, Treachery, Betrayal, Death, Disloyalty, Greedy, Immorality and many other themes that make the plot of these real life events to go forward the way they did.

Looking at the events that took place in Zimbabwe, many lessons can be learnt. We ought to learn that no autocrat last forever, this has been a fact that everyone has seen in the whole world that everything comes to an end, and surely the dawn fell for Mugabe who ruled Zimbabwe for 37 years with an iron fist. This has been noted with the constraining of Press freedom, constraining of human rights, notably the disappearance of Itai Dzamara during his reign (Phiri, 2015), the Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland, turning the bread basket of Africa into the worst economy ever to be seen in Africa apart from Somalia. All these events culminated to the unpopularity of Robert Mugabe with the Zimbabwean citizens and indeed his time to be forced out of power was fast approaching, and it surely did. The other lesson we learn from what transpired in Zimbabwe is that Dynasties always do not work and they are a recipe to an eventual downfall (Apps, 2017). The actions by the military can be best be described as an response to the betrayal of the revolution that was about to take place in the country, this is seen through Robert Mugabe’s move of deposing his long-time ally Vice President Emmerson Mnangangwa from power paving a way for his wife Grace Mugabe, this did not turn well with the military Generals as Grace Mugabe have no revolutionary credentials. Regardless of the revolutionary credentials, a Mugabe dynasty was a no go area, given Grace Mugabe’s record of expensive shopping, throwing massive parties when the populace are suffering she was not going to be a President-In-Designate.

To reflect on the events that took place in Zimbabwe, it must come to our senses as human beings gifted with a sense of forgiving, this has been the case with the Zimbabwean situation where a bloodless coup took place and Mugabe still enjoys State benefits regardless of all the atrocities he engineered during his reign. This shows that as Africans we must move away from politics of fixing and killing each other as they are other means of settling misunderstandings. Through dialogue and consensus. For the first time in Africa we have seen a bloodless coup coming out of Zimbabwe, now what is left is an economically viable Zimbabwe.

Moving on, Thomas Sankara gave hope to Africa and he set a good example for African leaders as we learn from his Presidency that becoming the top politician in a country is not a gateway to riches, he taught us that corruption can be foreign in a public office this was envisaged by him declaring his assets and those of his wife publicly and also we note that he even told his relatives not to expect anything from him. Harsch (2014) further outlines that Thomas Sankara’s two sons kept on attending public schools even after he became President. Africa being a patriarchal society we often see women being seeing as property and as of no importance, however Thomas Sankara gave a deaf ear to that as he championed women empowerment during his tenure as President as he travelled from village to village to address women and come up with projects that were suitable for them. Thomas Sankara even went to an extent of likening women empowerment to the revolution saying that it was not out of charity they were empowering women.

What one can reflect from Sankara is his decolonial mentality that he installed in the minds of the Burkinabe people, which he started by changing the country’s name from a meaningless “Upper Volta” to Burkina Faso which means “the land of upright man” (Amupanda, 2017). He wanted an Africa for Africans and African goods for Africans. He believed in the empowerment of the African people by teaching them of self-sufficiency and redistributing land back to the people.

Patrice Lumumba’s short term in office gave us a lot to learn from the events that happened. Just like the death of Sankara that was instigated by France, the same happened with Patrice Lumumba but this time through the hands of Belgium, USA and Britain (Zeilig, 2008). What we can learn from all this is that our enemies will try by all means that Africa does not taste the true meaning of freedom and independence as they know that Africa’s rise is detrimental to their economies. We also learn that they are people who prioritize their personal gains at the expense of the masses this was seen through Mobutu who orchestrated the death of the man behind his rise due to personal greed and manipulation by the west. On the death of Patrice Lumumba we ought to learn that we must be vigilant in fighting neo-colonialism.

The death of Patrice Lumumba though painful as it was to the African Liberation struggle, we ought to see that it set a foundation and a legacy on which most African countries built from to get their independence and this led to the rise of the slogan “stronger in death than in life”. Lumumba became a symbolism of African Liberation and his face stood among Che Guevara’s portrait in many demonstrations across the world.

In synopsis, from all the three scenarios we ought to reflect that Africa needs proper legal and philosophical statutory that will enable democratic transitions. These transitions will foster non-violence when it comes to governance in Africa as a whole, these transitions will assist in making sure no blood is spilt for one to get out of power. These scenarios robbed Africa of great revolutionists in the name of Patrice Lumumba and Thomas Sankara for they were fathers of African regeneration. However the perpetrators of their deaths could have championed in killing them but they failed to suffocate their teachings which still roar in African minds and the World at large until today.

10. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have been able to illustrate (pertaining to our case studies) that leaders that once were allies had quickly turned their relationships sour and this in all three cases ended in bloody betrayal. In the words of William clay, “This is quite a game, politics. There are no permanent enemies, and no permanent friends, only permanent interests.” In all cases power seemed to be the underlying current that quickly turned comrades to rivals.

Burkina Faso, a former French colony until 1960, had amassed much hope after Thomas Sankara obtained power through a coup d’état to overthrow Jean-Baptiste Ouegadroago (who ruled from independence until 1982). Thomas Sankara let one of the most innovative revolutionary, even though it was short lived and led to the his murder by his own soldiers under the command of Blaise Compaore (Iowusu, 1989).

Blaise Compaore led a coup d'état during which Thomas Sankara was killed. He then introduced a policy of "rectification", overturning the Marxist policies pursued by Sankara. Upon taking the presidency, Blaise Compaore reverted many of the policies of Sankara. Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore were both born in central Upper Volta as the territory of Burkina Faso. They met in Morocco where they both attended military school and received Para commando training. They both had no academic training or qualifications. Both Sankara and Compaore were nationalists. They both were advocates for the freedom of their country (Roberts, 1991).

Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore had built a strong stable friendship built over the years which went beyond that of allies or mere colleagues. They chose similar paths which included the involvement of both military training and politics. Compaore and Sankara together with a number of other comrades, overthrew Ouegadroago in an attempt to build a better society.

Unfortunately, from the beginning the Sankara regime lost all legitimate support as power became unbearably concentrated in the hands of a few military personnel (which of course included Blaise Compaore). As popular demand continued to drop, Blaise Compaore (Sankara’s right man) decided it was time for change. He and twelve other officials led a coup in 1987 which killed Thomas Sankara violently and led to the installation of Compaore as President.

In the next case study of Patrice Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ended in a true tragedy. Lumumba was, however, a man of strong character who intended to pursue his policies, regardless of the enemies he made within his country or abroad. (Cordell and Wallerstein n.d)Mobutu and Lumumba began their friendship in 1957 soon after Mobutu joined his political party. They became close allies and Congo was officially independent in 1960. Lumumba the first Prime Minister of Congo and was well informed on Marxist ideology and greatly expressed interest in it to transform Congo. Mobutu through conversations with the Pan-Africanist leader became fascinated with what he termed ‘Lumumba’s Idealism’ and was educated about it. Mobutu greatly supported these ideas. Despite having being educated by Lumumba’s idealism, Sese Seko’s 32 year reign was characterized by unimaginable terror instead of restoration of peace.

During the Congo Crisis, Mobutu, serving as chief of staff of the army and supported by Belgium and the United States, deposed the nationalist government of Patrice Lumumba in 1960. Mobutu then installed a government which later arranged for Lumumba's execution in 1961. Lumumba was imprisoned by state authorities under Mobutu and executed by a firing squad under the command of Katangan authorities (Brown, 2012). In 1967, Mobutu abolished the national Constitution and established a new Loi Fondamentale, which inaugurated the single-party system and made him the country’s chief strongman (Ikambana, 2007). He installed a totalitarian political system that systematically eliminated political opponents. Mobutu continued to lead the country's armed forces until he took power directly in a second coup in 1965. As part of his program of "national authenticity", Mobutu changed the Congo's name to Zaire in 1971. Mobutu established a one-party state in which all power was concentrated in his hands. Mobutu presided over the country for over three decades, a period of widespread human rights violations. By 1991, economic deterioration and unrest led him to agree to share power with opposition leaders, but he used the army to thwart change until May 1997, when rebel forces led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila expelled him from the country (Brown, 2012). Both Patrice Lumbumba and Joseph Mobutu were born in the Democratic Republic of Congo. They both are former DRC Presidents who went into power through a bloodless coup d'etat. They were both against the colonial regime and believed in an inclusive party state. They had similar form of leadership which was dictatorship. They had no respect for human rights and they abused their powers. Their power was gained by instilling fear in the people.

Internal conflict began to become uncontainable within the DRC soon after independence, which led Patrice Lumumba (the Prime Minister) to seek assistance from the United States to calm the situation. The US remained unwilling to help because the disagreed with Lumumba’s soviet oriented ideas. With no choice left, Lumumba sought help from the Soviet Union knowing fully that consequences may follow but oblivious to how severe these consequences would be. The United States angered by this hatched a plan with Mobutu to replace the Prime Minister. Patrice Lumumba was first imprisoned under Mobutu’s command and thereafter successfully assassinated.

In Congo, Lumumba's assassination is rightly viewed as the country's original sin. Occurring approximately seven months after independence. It was a stumbling block to the ideals of national unity, economic independence and pan-African solidarity that Lumumba had championed, as well as a shattering blow to the hopes of millions of Congolese for freedom and material prosperity (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2011).

Former President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe and current President Emerson Mnangagwa were both involved in the liberation struggle against the former colonizers in 1980.They were both prisoners during the liberation struggle. Both Mugabe and Mnangagwa are of the Shona tribe. They both believed and still believe in a one party state. They both fall under the same party. Mnangagwa was a guerilla leader during the Rhodesian Bush War. After Zimbabwe was recognized in 1980, Mnangagwa held a series of senior Cabinet positions under Mugabe, including minister of state security during the Gukurahundi massacres in which up to 20,000 mainly Ndebele civilians were killed. Mnangagwa blamed the army for the massacres and continued to hold senior Cabinet positions. Mnangagwa served as First Vice President of Zimbabwe from 2014 until his dismissal in early-November 2017, which prompted a coup d'état. On 21 November 2017, Mugabe resigned (a removal recognized in a statement by the African Union, not as a "coup", but as a legitimate expression of the will of the Zimbabwean people), and Mnangagwa was sworn in as President on 24 November 2017.

Mobutu, Compaore and Mnangagwa came into power through military coups. Patrice Lumumba, Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara were both removed by people they helped to climb the ranks in their governments

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